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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is the State's appeal from the district court's order dismissing the Information 
against Mr. Phillip Ruggiero on First Amendment grounds. 
B. Factual Summary and General Course of Proceedings 
The State charged Mr. Ruggiero with three counts of offering a false document as 
evidence in violation of LC. § 18-2601 or, alternatively, of preparing false evidence with the 
intent to allow it to be produced for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose in a lawfully authorized 
trial, proceeding or inquiry in violation ofI.C. § 18-2602. R. 32-35. According the evidence the 
State presented at the preliminary hearing, Mr. Ruggiero was charged with misdemeanor 
stalking. Preliminary Hearing ("PH") Tr. p. 8, In. 2-14; p. 10, In. 3-5. While that case was 
pending, three letters were sent to the handlingjudge. Id. at p. 11, In. 10-21; p. 25, In. 1; p. 27, 
In. 24; see also R. 96-98. One of these letter purported to be from the alleged victim of the 
stalking and the other two from persons who allegedly had knowledge of relevant facts. See id. 
These letters were forwarded to the handling Boise City prosecutor who contacted the 
alleged victim and inquired whether she had in fact written the letter. PH Tr. p. 13, In. 5-10; p. 
52, In. 20 - p. 53, In. 22. Upon the alleged victim's indication she had not written the letter, the 
prosecutor obtained her affidavit swearing that the information contained in the letter was not 
true. PH Tr. p. 13, In. 5 - p. 14, In. 21; p. 55, In. 9-24. The misdemeanor stalking case thereafter 
continued. PH Tr. p. 14, In. 22-25. 
The letters were provided to a detective who then interrogated Mr. Ruggiero at his home. 
PH Tr. p. 28, In. 3 - p. 31, In. I 0. Although Mr. Ruggiero strenuously denied writing the letters 
at issue, the magistrate construed some of his responses to the detective as substantial evidence 
of an acknowledgment that he had written the letters. PH Tr. p. 39, In. 3-5; p. 45, In. 8-24; p. 76, 
In. 2-24. 
The magistrate declined to find probable cause that Mr. Ruggiero violated LC.§ 18-2601 
because the statute requires that the false documents be offered into evidence. PH Tr. p. 74, In. 
15-23. However, the magistrate noted that LC.§ 18-2602 did not require forgery and while the: 
words "trial, proceeding or inquiry" are still there, it doesn't say "offering as 
evidence," it's producing them in the trial, proceeding, or inquiry ... And I agree 
with the State that when you send it to the judge, the one that's in charge of the 
thing, you are certainly intending to produce it somewhere in that trial proceeding 
or inquiry and have somebody rely on it. 
And so I certainly think that that is written broadly enough to cover the letters, 
even if you are not prepared or intending to introduce it formally the way you two 
do when we actually have a proceeding in front of a judge or a jury in open court. 
Id. at p. 75, In. 1-23 (emphasis added). The magistrate thus bound Mr. Ruggiero over to the 
district court on the three counts that he violated J.C. § 18-2602. R. 36-38. 
Mr. Ruggiero moved to dismiss the Information because it was not supported by 
substantial evidence that he committed the crimes for which he had been held to answer. R. 60-
61. Specifically, Mr. Ruggiero argued that the State had not produced sufficient evidence that he 
"willfully prepared false evidence," that he intended "to produce it or allow it to be produced for 
any fraudulent or deceitful purpose as genuine or true" or that he intended the false evidence to 
be produced "at a trial proceeding or inquiry" as required by J.C. § 18-2602. R. 64. Mr. 
Ruggiero also argued that Section 18-2602 infringed on the First Amendment as interpreted by 
the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537 (2012) and was void 
for vagueness and thus invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. R. 
2 
85. 
In a written opinion, the district court first noted that a judge is not ethically permitted to 
receive or review ex parte communications such as letters. R. 100. Thus, "the bottom line is that 
the defendant is being charged with sending false and forged documents which the trial judge 
would not be permitted to consider in any pending case [and that] are not material to any trial 
proceeding or inquiry." Id. The district court thus found that the circumstances implicated the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Alvarez. After discussing the Alvarez Court's reasoning, the 
district court concluded that: 
LC. § 18-2602 does not confine itself to material statements made to gain a 
material advantage or to false documents created to be submitted as evidence 
which is punished instead by LC.§ 18-2601. As applied in this instance, LC.§ 
18-2602 is being used to punish a false statement which could not be used in 
evidence and which could not be used to gain any material advantage. 
Thus LC. § 18-2602 in the context of criminalizing a false or forged letter sent to 
a judge who is not ethically permitted to consider the ex parte communication for 
any reason punishes falsity alone and runs afoul of Alvarez. In Alvarez, the 
Supreme Court noted: As a general matter the First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, 
its subject matter, or its content." Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 
U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, the 
Constitution "demands that content based restrictions on speech be presumed 
invalid and that the Government bear the burden of showing their 
constitutionality." Citing Ashcroft, 542 U. 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004). Since the 
letters in this case could not be considered by the judge for any purpose, were not 
offered in evidence or intended to be offered into evidence (and could not be 
admitted into evidence), the application of the statute in this case criminalizes a 
false and immaterial statement which Alvarez renders impermissible. 
R. 101-102. The district court thus granted Mr. Ruggiero's motion and dismissed the case. Id. 
The State then appealed. R. 103-05. 
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III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The State frames the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in granting Ruggiero's motion to dismiss after erroneously 
concluding that his alleged acts of preparing false evidence were protected by the First 
Amendment? 
Mr. Ruggiero rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
A. Did the district court correctly dismiss this case because criminalizing the letters 
was not actually necessary to protect the State's interest and thus constitutes an impermissible 
regulation of content-based speech? 
B. Even if the district court erred in dismissing the Information on First Amendment 
grounds, should the dismissal be affirmed because the State failed to produce substantial 
evidence of each essential element to establish a violation ofl.C. § 18-2602? 
C. Even if the district court erred in dismissing the Information on First Amendment 
grounds, should the dismissal be affirmed because I.C. § 18-2602 is void for vagueness? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Correctly Dismissed this Case Because it is Unnecessary to 
Criminalize the Letters in Order to Protect the State's Interest and Application of 
J.C. § 18-2602 to this Case Thus Violates the First Amendment 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the government from 
restricting expression because of "its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." 
Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2543, citing Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564,573 
(2002). Accordingly, the Constitution "'demands that content-based restrictions on speech be 
presumed invalid ... and that the Government bear the burden of showing their 
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constitutionality."' Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2543-44, citing Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties 
Union, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004). 
When content-based speech regulation is in question, exacting scrutiny is required. 
Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2543. The First Amendment requires that the State's chosen restriction on 
the speech at issue be "actually necessary" to achieve its interest, meaning there must be a direct 
causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 
2549. Content-based restrictions on speech have generally been permitted only when confined to 
a few historic and traditional categories of expression. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2544; United States 
v. Stevens, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010). These traditional categories include advocacy intended, 
and likely, to incite imminent lawless action; obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal 
conduct; so-called "fighting words"; child pornography; fraud; true threats; and speech 
presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent. Alvarez, 
132 S.Ct. at 2544. 
Here, Mr. Ruggiero was accused of violating I.C. § 18-2602, which is titled "preparing 
false evidence" and provides: 
Every person guilty of preparing any false or antedated book, paper, record, 
instrument in writing, or other matter or thing, with intent to produce it, or allow it 
to be produced, for any fraudulent or deceitful purpose, as genuine or true, upon 
any trial, proceeding or inquiry whatever, authorized by law, is guilty of felony. 
In finding probable cause, the magistrate construed this statute to encompass any document sent 
to the judge for a deceitful purpose while a case is pending rather than limit it to circumstances in 
which a false document is prepared with the intent to produce during a judicial or administrative 
proceeding. PH Tr. p. 75, In. 1-23. The magistrate thus concluded that Mr. Ruggiero would 
have violated Section 18-2602 by sending unswom letters to the handling judge, even if they 
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were not intended to be produced as evidence during a court proceeding. Id. at In. 19-23. 
As found by the district court, it is unnecessary to criminalize letters such as those at issue 
here to protect the integrity of the legal system because the letters could not be considered for any 
purpose during open court. The State cannot meet its burden to establish a direct casual link 
between the restriction and the injury to be prevented and its chosen restriction on the speech at 
issue is not actually necessary to achieve its interest. Accordingly, the district court correctly 
dismissed this case on First Amendment grounds. 
1. The letters are not outside First Amendment protection 
According to the State, the district court concluded Section 18-2602 was unconstitutional 
because it was being used to punish "falsity alone" since the judge would not be ethically 
permitted to consider the ex parte communication for any reason. Respondent's Brief, p. 6. The 
State further urges that First Amendment principles are not threatened by LC.§ 18-2602 because 
the statute does not "restrict expression because of its message." Id. The State incorrectly 
applies First Amendment standards to this case. 
The Alvarez Court reasoned that in order to fully protect the type of expression that the 
First Amendment seeks to guarantee, some false statements are inevitable in order to ensure an 
open and vigorous expression of views in public and private conversation. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 
2544. Thus, there is no general exception to the First Amendment for false statements. Id. 
Instead, with the traditional exceptions to the First Amendment's protection involving false 
statements, such as defamation and fraud, the false statement has to have been accompanied by a 
legally cognizable harm. Id. at 2545. The district court concluded that I.C. § 18-2602 runs afoul 
of the First Amendment in this case because the letters were "immaterial" and, thus, the falsity 
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was not accompanied by any legally cognizable harm. R. 102. 
Further, contrary to the State's assertion, I.C. § 18-2602 does restrict expression because 
of its message - it restricts statements because they are false. In this respect, Section 18-2602 is 
analogous to the Stolen Valor Act, which made it a felony to falsely represent that an individual 
has been awarded a decoration of medal. "False speech is not a general category that is 
presumptively unprotected by the First Amendment." Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2546-47. Thus, the 
State must demonstrate that the letters' falsity was accompanied by a cognizable harm and that 
its chosen restriction on false statements is actually necessary to protect against that harm. 
Otherwise, it fails to meet its burden to establish that the restriction is permissible under the First 
Amendment. 
2. The letters did not threaten the integrity of the legal system in the same 
manner as perjury or impersonating a government official 
The State notes that Section 18-2602 criminalizes more than falsity as the false statement 
must be made "with intent to produce it, or allow it to be produced, for any fraudulent or 
deceitful purpose" in an authorized proceeding. Respondent's Brief, p. 8. The State analogizes 
the statute at issue here to a perjury statute or one prohibiting impersonating a public official, 
which are unquestionably constitutional. 
"It is not simply because perjured statements are false that they lack First Amendment 
protection." Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2546. Sworn testimony is quite distinct from unsworn lies 
because unlike speech in other contexts, "testimony under oath has the formality and gravity 
necessary to remind the witness that his or her statements will be the basis for official 
governmental action." Id. Further, perjured testimony is at war with justice because it can cause 
a court to render a "'judgment not resting on truth."' Alvarez, l 32 S.Ct. at 2546, citing In re 
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Michael, 326 U.S. 224,227 (1945). Perjury thus undermines the function and province of the 
law and threatens the integrity of judgments that are the basis of the legal system. Alvarez, 132 
S.Ct. at 2546. 
The letters allegedly written by Ruggiero were simply unsworn correspondence directed 
to the handling judge, unaccompanied by any formality or gravity suggesting the speech could 
subject the author to criminal sanctions. Additionally, because the magistrate did not limit the 
statute to circumstances in which the letters were intended to be produced during a court 
proceeding, they did not threaten to undermine the integrity of the truth-finding function in the 
same manner as perjury or attempting to produce false evidence. 
When perjury or false evidence is submitted during a judicial or administrative hearing, 
the fact-finding process itself is tainted by the false information. The magistrate did not limit 
Section 18-2602 to circumstances in which the accused intends the false document to be 
produced during a proceeding (i.e. trial or other hearing), which involves an attempt to offer false 
evidence. A different question would be presented by preparation of an "antedated book" with 
the intent the same be produced during an embezzlement trial to establish that expenses were 
legitimate. While such speech would bear less threat to the integrity of the truth-finding process 
than actually offering the book into evidence because there would be time to discover the falsity, 
it would at least involve some threat to a judgment "resting on truth." 
Conversely, the letters at bar could not be considered by the judge for any purpose and 
were correspondence, not "false evidence." The State notes that the actual admissibility of the 
letters does not control and, rather, that a violation is established in Mr. Ruggiero's intent 
regarding the use of the same. Nonetheless, the magistrate concluded it was sufficient to bind 
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Mr. Ruggiero over to the district court because he made an informal false statement to the judge, 
even ifhe had no intent that the letters be produced as evidence or considered during a trial or 
other proceeding. 
3. Criminalizing the letters is not "actually necessary" to protect the integrity of 
the truth finding process 
The State urges that application of I.C. § 18-2602 to this case is constitutional because the 
false statements "undermine[] the function and province of the law" and impair the "integrity of 
Government processes." Protecting the integrity of the judicial system is unquestionably a 
compelling interest. Nonetheless, "to recite the Government's compelling interests is not to end 
the matter." Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2549. 
Rather, the First Amendment requires that the Government's chosen restriction on the 
speech at issue be "actually necessary" to achieve its interest meaning "there must be a direct 
causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented." Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 
2549; see also Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011). Further, 
the State must be able to show how counter-speech cannot suffice to achieve its interest. 
Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2549. 
As found by the district court, "the bottom line is that the defendant is being charged with 
sending false and forged documents which the trial judge would not be permitted to consider in 
any pending case [ and that] are not material to any trial proceeding or inquiry." R. 100. The trial 
judge forwarded the correspondence to the prosecutor, who easily ascertained the falsity of the 
letters' contents and the case continued "in its course." PH Tr. p. 13, In. 5 - p. 14, In. 25; p. 52, 
In. 20 - p. 53, In. 22; p. 55, In. 9-24. Thus, as in Alvarez, "the dynamics of free speech, of 
counterspeech, of refutation, ... [overcame] the lie" [Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2549. The letters 
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presented no appreciable risk to the integrity of the judicial process and legal system. 
Counterspeech's ability to prevent the harm the State seeks to prevent with criminalizing 
the correspondence at issue is thus easily distinguished from perjury or offering false evidence. 
When testimony or evidence is offered as evidence during a proceeding, it is necessarily 
considered by the trier of fact and directly threatens to contaminates the truth finding function of 
the tribunal. Thus, simple counter-speech or refutation are generally insufficient to overcome 
perjury because the hann is inflicted when the speech is uttered. Conversely, rules of evidence, 
judicial ethical canons and the prosecutor's ability to investigate all stood between the letters at 
issue and any cognizable hann. 
"The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true." Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2550. 
As found by the district court: 
Since the letters in this case could not be considered by the judge for any purpose, 
were not offered in evidence or intended to be offered into evidence (and could 
not be admitted into evidence), the application of the statute in this case 
[impermissibly] criminalizes a false and immaterial statement. 
R. 101-02 (emphasis added). The State's chosen restriction is not actually necessary to protect 
its interest in the maintaining the integrity of the judiciary and legal system and cannot stand in 
the face of the First Amendment. 
4. Application of I.C. § 18-2602 to this case is controlled by Alvarez 
notwithstanding the differences between that statute and the Stolen Valor 
Act 
The State distinguishes the Stolen Valor Act from LC. § 18-2602, arguing that "unlike the 
Stolen Valor Act, LC. § 18-2602 does not prohibit specific speech on 'one subject in almost 
limitless times and settings' and 'without regard to whether the lie was made for the purpose of 
material gain."' Respondent's Brief, p. 7. The State also notes that J.C.§ 18-2602 does not 
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target "falsity alone" since "its reach is limited to a specific setting where the statement is offered 
for a particular purpose." Id. However, the discussion relied on by the State was not material to 
the Alvarez Court's decision. Regardless of the differences between the Stolen Valor Act and 
LC. § 18-2602, application of the statute to this case cannot meet the exacting scrutiny standard 
and the district court correctly dismissed this case. 
The Alvarez Court noted that while the lie at issue in that case was made during a public 
meeting, the Act would apply "to a false statement made at any time, in any place, to any 
person," including "personal, whispered conversations within a home." Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 
2547. "The statute seeks to control and suppress all false statements on this one subject in 
almost limitless times and settings." Id. As noted by the State, LC.§ 18-2602 does not prohibit 
all false speech on a certain topic but, rather, prohibits false speech when intended to be 
"produced ... upon any trial, proceeding or inquiry whatever, authorized by law." As previously 
noted, the magistrate construed that language to prohibit "producing" anything "somewhere" in 
the case with the intent that "somebody rely on it," regardless of whether the accused intended 
the document to be produced during an actual proceeding. PH Tr. p. 75, In. 1-23. 
Further, the Alvarez Court did not hold that a law must restrict all speech on a certain 
topic to run afoul of the First Amendment. Rather, in the portion of the opinion relied on by the 
State, the Court used "the probable, and adverse, effect of the Act on freedom of expression" to 
illustrate "in a fundamental way, the reasons for the Law's distrust of content-based speech 
prohibitions." Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2547. After discussing the broad reach of the Act, the Court 
indicated: "The previous discussion suffices to show that the Act conflicts with free speech 
principles. But even when examined within its own narrow sphere of operation, the Act cannot 
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survive." Id. at 2248. The Court then examined whether the Act was "actually necessary" to 
achieve its interest and found that the Act did not satisfy "exacting scrutiny." Id. at 2249. 
Specifically, the Court indicated that: "The link between the Government's interest in 
protecting the integrity of the military honors system and the Act's restriction on the false claims 
of liars like respondent has not been shown." Id. The Court acknowledged that false claims to 
military honors could demean the purpose of the award and insult the bravery of those who have 
been legitimately honored. Id. Nonetheless, "these interests do not satisfy the Government's 
heavy burden when it seeks to regulate protected speech" and that the government "points to no 
evidence to support its claim that the public's general perception of military awards is diluted by 
false claims such as those made by Alvarez." Id. 
In addition to the "lack of a causal link between the Government's stated interest and the 
Act," the Government: 
has not shown, and cannot show, why counterspeech would not suffice to achieve 
its interest. The facts of this case indicate that the dynamics of free speech, of 
counterspeech, of refutation, can overcome the lie. Respondent lied at a public 
meeting. Even before the FBI began investigating him for his false statements 
"Alvarez was perceived as a phony," 617 F.3d, at 1211. Once the lie was made 
public, he was ridiculed online, ... and a fellow board member called for his 
resignation, ... There is good reason to believe that a similar fate would befall 
other false claimants. 
Id at 2249-50 (internal citations omitted). 
This case is analogous. As discussed above, the State easily ascertained that the letters 
allegedly written by Mr. Ruggiero were false. Because the correspondence was not intended as 
evidence and could not be considered by the judge for any purpose, it was quite unnecessary to 
criminalize Mr. Ruggiero's alleged conduct in order to prevent any threat to the integrity of the 
judicial process. Further, if established, Mr. Ruggiero's conduct in authoring the letters could 
12 
have potentially been used against him as evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) and could have been 
viewed as an aggravating circumstance in sentencing him ifhe was found guilty of stalking. As 
in Alvarez, "there is good reason to believe that a similar fate would befall" others who write 
false ex parte letters to judges. 
The State can neither show a direct causal link between the conduct at issue and the harm 
to be prevented nor that counterspeech is insufficient to achieve the State's interest. 
Accordingly, notwithstanding the differences between the Stolen Valor Act and LC.§ 18-2602, 
the Idaho statute cannot meet the exacting scrutiny standard and the district court correctly 
dismissed this case. 
5. Conclusion 
As applied in this case, I.C. § 18-2602, is not limited to instances in which the accused 
intends the false item to be produced as evidence during a trial or other proceeding. Instead, the 
statute is violated when a letter with false statements is sent to the court for any deceitful purpose 
while the case is pending. 
Because such speech could not be considered by the judge and was not intended as 
evidence, it presented no appreciable risk to the integrity of the legal system. Accordingly, the 
restriction lacks a direct causal link between the injury to be prevented and cannot pass the 
exacting scrutiny standard. This Court should therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of 
the Information in this case. 
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B. The State Presented Insufficient Evidence to Find that Mr. Ruggiero Violated I.C. § 
18-2602 and, Thus, this Court Should Affirm the Dismissal of this Case Even if the 
District Court Erred in Dismissing it on First Amendment Grounds 
A criminal defendant, charged by complaint with a felony, is entitled to a preliminary 
hearing in which the magistrate must determine whether a public offense has been committed 
and, if so, whether probable cause exists to believe that the defendant committed it. State v. 
Pole, 139 Idaho 370,372, 79 P.3d 729, 731 (Ct. App. 2003); see also LC.§ 19-804; I.C.R. 5.1; 
State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296,299, 912 P.2d 664, 667 (Ct. App. 1995). The finding of 
probable cause must be based upon substantial evidence on every material element of the offense 
charged. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 504, 80 P.3d 1103, 1105 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Pursuant to LC. § 19-815A: 
A defendant once held to answer to a criminal charge under this chapter 
may challenge the sufficiency of evidence educed at the preliminary examination 
by a motion to dismiss the commitment, signed by the magistrate, or the 
information filed by the prosecuting attorney. Such motion to dismiss shall be 
heard by a district judge. 
The district court should grant a motion to dismiss where a reasonable view of the 
evidence, including permissible inferences, fails to establish that it is likely that an offense 
occurred and that the accused committed it. See State v. Wengren, 126 Idaho 662, 665, 889 P.2d 
96, 99 (Ct. App. 1995). 
In addition to arguing that this case should be dismissed on First Amendment grounds, 
Mr. Ruggiero asked the district court to dismiss the Information pursuant to LC. § 19-81 SA 
because the State failed to produced substantial evidence that he violated LC. § 18-2602. R. 66-
68. This Court should affirm the dismissal of the Information on this ground. See Southern 
Idaho Realty of Twin Falls, lnc.-Century 21 v. Larry.!. Hellhake, 102 Idaho 613,614,636 P.2d 
14 
168, 169 (1981) (where the order of the lower court is correct but entered on a different theory, 
the order will be affirmed on the correct theory); State v. Wagner, 149 Idaho 268,233 P.3d 199, 
201 (Ct. App. 2010) (appellate court may affirm a lower court's decision on a legal theory 
different from the one applied by that court). 
The magistrate found probable cause that Mr. Ruggiero violated I.C. § 18-2602, titled 
"preparing false evidence" and which provides: 
Every person guilty of preparing any false or antedated book, paper, record, 
instrument in writing, or other matter or thing, with intent to produce it, or allow it 
to be produced, for any fraudulent or deceitful purpose, as genuine or true, upon 
any trial, proceeding or inquiry whatever, authorized by law, is guilty of felony. 
The magistrate did not limit the phrase "produced ... upon any trial, proceeding or inquiry 
whatever" to circumstances in which the accused intends to produce the item during a proceeding 
such as trial or hearing. PH Tr. p. 75, In. 18-23. Rather, the magistrate concluded it was 
sufficient that the accused send the item to the handling judge with the intent to "produce it 
somewhere in that trial proceeding or inquiry and have somebody rely on it." Id. at p. 75, In. 1-
17. 
However, the phrase "upon any trial, proceeding or inquiry whatever" refers to an actual 
proceeding - whether a trial, motion hearing or an administrative hearing - and does not extend 
to any correspondence simply because it was sent to the handling judge while a case is pending. 
Further, there was no substantial evidence to find that Mr. Ruggiero intended that the 
correspondence be produced and relied on in open court. Accordingly, when the correct 
interpretation of LC. § 18-2602 is applied to the facts of this case, there is insufficient evidence 
to find probable cause that Mr. Ruggiero violated that statute. 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. 
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State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882,885,292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013); State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 
Idaho 775,781,275 P.3d 1, 7 (Ct. App. 2012). In interpreting an ambiguous language, this Court 
must ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 
462,988 P.2d 685,688 (1999); Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho at 781,275 P.3d at 7. In addition 
to examining the literal words of the statute, this Court must examine the context of those words, 
the public policy behind the statute and its legislative history to ascertain the intent of the 
legislature. Id. 
This Court construes all sections of the applicable statutes together in determining the 
legislative intent as to the scope of a statute. JR. Simplot Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Com 'n, 
120 Idaho 849, 854, 820 P.2d 1206, 1211 (1991); Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho at 781,275 P.3d 
at 7. Chapter 26 to Title 18 is titled "Evidence Falsified or Concealed and Witnesses 
Intimidated or Bribed." The Section immediately preceding that at issue here is titled "Falsifying 
evidence - Offering forged or fraudulent documents in evidence" and provides: 
Every person who, upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry or investigation whatever 
authorized or permitted by law, offers in evidence as genuine or true, any book, 
paper, document, record, or other instrument in writing, knowing the same to have 
been forged or fraudulently altered or antedated, is guilty of felony. 
LC.§ 18-2601 
Thus, Section 18-2601 criminalizes offering a false document into evidence during a 
proceeding while Section 18-2602 criminalizes preparing "false evidence" with the intent it be 
produced during a proceeding. Read with Section 18-2601, Section 18-2602 prohibits preparing 
a false document with the intent it be produced during a proceeding and does not include merely 
sending a letter with false statements to the handling judge concerning a pending case. 
Further, "where general words of a statute follow an enumeration of persons or things, 
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such general words will be construed as meaning persons or things of like or similar class or 
character to those specifically enumerated, usually designated the ejusdem generis rule." State v. 
Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 831, 25 P.3d 850, 854 (2001). Section 18-2602 refers to "any false or 
antedated book, paper, record, instrument in writing, or other matter or thing, with intent to 
produce it, ... upon any trial, proceeding or inquiry whatever, authorized by law." By 
concluding the statute encompassed correspondence sent to the handling judge about a case, the 
magistrate construed the general terms "other matter or thing" produced in an "inquiry whatever 
authorized by law" without regard to the context of those general terms. 
The terms "antedated book, paper or record" clearly refer to types of evidence that would 
be considered in determining the truth of a charge or question presented in a civil complaint. 
Similarly, the reference to "inquiry whatever authorized by law" must be considered in the 
context of the more specific terms "trial" or "proceeding." By inserting the catch-all phrase 
"whatever, authorized by law," the legislature intended to encompass any legally authorized fact-
finding process, such as an administrative hearing, and not limit the statute's application to 
judicial proceedings. The legislature did not intend to extend the statute's scope to any 
correspondence sent to the handling judge while a case is pending regardless of whether it is 
intended to be produced in the fact-finding proceeding. 
Section 18-2602, titled preparing false evidence, applies to the preparation of documents 
with the intent they be produced for a deceitful purpose during a proceeding authorized by law. 
The statute does not apply to correspondence sent to the handling judge during the pendency of 
the case, when such correspondence is not intended to be used as "false evidence." Because there 
was no substantial evidence to find that Mr. Ruggiero intended the correspondence to be 
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produced and relied on as evidence during a proceeding, there was insufficient evidence to find 
probable cause that Mr. Ruggiero violated I.C. § 18-2602. Accordingly, the dismissal of this 
case should be affirmed even if the district court erred in its First Amendment ruling. 
C. Idaho Code Section 18-2602 is Void for Vagueness and, Thus, this Court Should 
Affirm the Dismissal of this Case Even if the District Court Erred in Dismissing it 
on First Amendment Grounds 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This doctrine requires that a statute 
defining criminal conduct be worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people 
can understand what conduct is prohibited and that the statute be worded in a manner that does 
not allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,(1982); State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711-12, 69 P.3d 
126, 131-32 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by Evans v. Michigan, 133 S.Ct. 1069 (2013); 
State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34,218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct. App. 2009). It is a basic principle of due 
process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. 
Graynedv. City of Rociford, 408 U.S. 104,(1972); Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711, 69 P.3d at 131; 
lvfartin, 148 Idaho at 34-35, 218 P.3d at 13-14. Furthermore, as a matter of due process, no one 
may be required at the peril of loss of liberty to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. 
Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711-12, 69 P.3d at 131-32; Martin, 148 Idaho at 35, 218 P.3d at 14. 
Due process requires that all be informed as to what the State commands or forbids and 
that men of common intelligence not be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law. State 
v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195,197,969 P.2d 244,246 (1998); Afartin, 148 Idaho at 35,218 P.3d at 14. 
A statute may be void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary 
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intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it fails to establish minimal guidelines to 
govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute. Ko/ender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 
352, 357-58 (1983); Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132; State v. Larsen, 135 Idaho 754, 
756, 24 P.3d 702, 704 (2001). 
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a 
defendant's conduct. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132; Martin, 148 Idaho at 35,218 
P.3d at 14. To succeed on an "as applied" vagueness challenge, a complainant must show that 
the statute, as applied to the defendant's conduct, failed to provide fair notice that the defendant's 
conduct was proscribed or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police had 
unbridled discretion in determining whether to arrest him. Id. 
The magistrate construed the phrase in "any trial proceeding or inquiry whatever" as 
including the intent to produce it somewhere in the case and have someone rely on it. PH Tr. p. 
72, In. 1-23. Such an interpretation fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary 
intelligence concerning the conduct LC. § 18-2602 proscribes and fails to establish minimal 
guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute. The void for 
vagueness doctrine prohibits this very process because of the inevitable danger of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application when police officers, judges and juries are granted the freedom to 
make subjective determinations regarding what exactly a statute means because the prohibited 
criminal conduct is not worded with sufficient clarity. 
Accordingly, as applied in this case, LC. 18-2602 is void for vagueness and violates the 
guarantees of due process of law. This Court should therefore affirm the dismissal of this case 
even if the district court ened in granting the motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ruggiero respectfully asks that this Court to affirm the district court's dismissal of 
the Information in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this 2-day~ 
. 
Robyn Fyffe 
Attorney for Philip Ruggiero 
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